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Abstract
Establishing an investment promotion  agency  has  empirical analysis indicates  that agencies  devoting more
become  a central part of most countries' development  resources on policy advocacy  are  more effective because
strategies. Today there  are more than l50 investment  such activity is not only beneficial  to  foreign investors
promotion agencies  worldwide. Yet very little is known  but also to domestic investors.  In contrast, investment
about what these agencies  have been  really doing,  generation  or targeting  strategies  appear expensive and
notably in  emerging countries,  and whether they have  risky, especially  in countries with poor investment
been effective  in influencing  investors'  decisions.  climates.
Using data from  a new survey on 58 countries,  Finally, certain  internal  characteristics  of the agencies
Morisset shows that greater  investment promotion is  are  associated with greater effectiveness.  The agencies
associated with higher  cross-country  foreign  direct  that have established  reporting mechanisms to the
investment (FDI) flows, on top of the influence  of the  country's highest policymakers  (the president or prime
country's investment  climate  and market size.  minister) or to the private sector have been  systematically
But this result has to be qualified  on several couIIts.  more efficient at attracting foreign  direct investment.
First, the effectiveness  of the agency depends on the  Such  institutional links are crucial  because they
country's environment  in which it operates.  An  agency in  contribute  to strengthen the government's  commitment
a poor investment climate is less effective  at attracting  as well as reinforce the agency's credibility and visibility
investment.  Second,  the scope of activities that an agency  in the business community.
undertakes  influences its performance.  Morisset's
This paper-a product of the Foreign  Investment  Advisory Service-is part of a  larger effort in the Bank to understand
foreign  direct  investment  flows.  Copies  of  the paper  are  available  free from  the  World  Bank,  1818  H  Street  NW,
Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Monte Feghali,  room 19-110, telephone 202-473-6177, fax 202-522-3262,  email
address mfeghahi@ifc.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org.  The
author may be  contacted  at jmorisset@worldbank.org.  April 2003.  (22 pages)
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l Lead Economist, Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS).  I am especially grateful  to Professor L.
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Johnson,  A. Minoux, N.Smith  and A. Alvarez contributed to this research.1.  Introduction
Establishing an investment promotion agency has become a central part of most
countries'  development strategies.  Today, there are worldwide  more than 160 national
investment promotion agencies  (IPAs) and over 250 sub-national  ones (UNCTAD, 2001).
This trend is relatively new since only a handful of these agencies existed 20 years ago.
Yet, the reality is that very little is known about what these agencies are actually doing in
most countries,  especially in the developing world.
The objective of this paper is to assess to what extent does investment promotion help
explain cross-country  variations in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.  We propose  a
simple analytical model in which  the promotion agency's behavior is assumed to reflect
the interest of the government (or a supervisory board) under the constraint of limited
budgetary resources.  It follows a certain tradition in public finance, see Heller,  1975.
Our model remains simple, as it is principally  use to derive an equation that can be easily
estimated for our sample of countries.  It should also be seen as a complement to the
seminal work of Wells and Wint, 2001,  who have provided the theoretical  underpinnings
of adopting investment promotion policies to attract FDI.2
Due in part to a lack of reliable data, no broad empirical study of investment promotion
agencies and their effectiveness in attracting FDI has been done to date3. This empirical
gap means that the debate on the effectiveness  of IPAs is still very open.  We use data
2 Wells and Wint  (2001) define investment promotion as "activities that disseminate information about, or
attempt to create an image of the investment site and  provide investment services for the prospective
investors".  This definition encapsulates the two most  important analytical justifications for IPAs.  The first
consists of its role in communicating  and disseminating  information.  Since this latter can be considered  as
a public good, it is possible that the private sector behavior will not lead to the optimal  social welfare.  As a
matter of fact, local  firms may voluntarily restrict information flows to prevent the entry of new potential
competitors.  The second justification is that the IPA can play a role of coordinating  most activities aimed
at improving the business environment in the host country.  This role can range from providing assistance
to potential  and existing investors  in their daily problems to lobbying for key policy and legal reforms.
3 The only empirical examination of the impact of FDI promotion on FDI flows was conducted by Wells
and Wint, 2001, based on data gathered in  1988. This study had serious  shortcomings  in terms of the
concept used to measure the promotion
3from a new survey that was conducted in  58 investment promotion agencies between
February and May 2002.4  At the outset, it is worth underscoring that our research should
be viewed as a first attempt to fill the existing empirical gap and has obvious limitations.
The most important is that we have been only able to examine empirically the
relationship between promotion and foreign direct investment at one point in time,
specifically the year 2001.  Unfortunately, data are simply not available for additional
years.  We believe that it nonetheless  provides some answers to four sets of questions that
should help IPA managers and policy makers to develop a better understanding of the
conditions -both external and internal to the agency-- that influence the effectiveness  of
promotion:
o  How does the amount of spending on investment promotion  affect its
effectiveness? Does an agency need to exceed a minimum level to have any
effect on international investors?
o  To what extent does the business environment or the country's characteristics
affect the effectiveness of investment promotion?  Does the quality of the
general business environment matter?
o  Does the effectiveness  of investment promotion vary according to the
functions or activities  on which it focuses?  Should an IPA devote more
resources toward policy advocacy or image building?
o  Is the effectiveness  of investment promotion influenced by different agencies'
characteristics  such as their structure, mandate,  sources of funding, and
institutional relationships?
The paper proceeds as follows.  In Section II we begin by presenting a small analytical
model through which we explain  the behavior of an investment promotion agency.
Section Em[  discusses the selection of variables  as well as the main sources of data used
for the application  of the above model.  Section IV presents the main empirical results
4The questionnaire was  sent via email or fax to  114 agencies,  both from developing  and industrial
countries. We received responses  from 75  agencies, yielding  a response rate of 66%. The rate was higher in
Latin America and in Eastern and Central Europe where it reached 86% and 71%, respectively.  A
description of the main responses can be found in the FIAS website  (www.fias.net).
4and provides a few interpretations.  Finally, Section V concludes and offers a few
directions for future research.
II.  A Small Analytical Model
To our knowledge, there has been no attempt to capture analytically the behavior of
investment promotion agencies.  Here we adopt a simple approach based on the
assumption that governments will  strive to maximize the level of FDI inflows  through its
promotion effort and at the same time, minimize resources allocated to this effort.  The
assumption that the agency attempts to maximize the level of FDI is based on the
observation  that for most countries the effectiveness  of promotion  is measured by its
capacity to attract (foreign) private investment.  It is true that some sophisticated IPAs try
to do more:  some aim at increasing the quantity as well as the quality of FDI, where
quality might be measured by investments  impact- in terms of job creation, exports or
technology transfers.  Nonetheless,  all developing countries are first and foremost
interested in attracting more PDI; suggesting that the IPA performance  can be evaluated
on the basis of this shared  goal.
At the same time than maximizing FDI inflows, the government  will attempt to minimize
the use of public resources required to finance the promotion effort.  Again, this
assumption  might be excessive because it could be argued that promotion agencies have
access to other sources of funding.  Still, public funds account for the about 70% of EPA
budgets worldwide -this percentage  exceeds even  80% for developing countries.
Alternative sources of funding, such as private or external sources, have been inconsistent
or weak complements  because of the public nature of investment promotion.
The government, or a set of policymakers,  maximizes their utility, taking into account
uses of public resources required to finance the promotion effort (P) and the objective to
attract FDI.  In any period, we assume the utility function of the IPA defines as:
5U = ao  + a, (FDI - FDI*)  - 22 (FDI-FDI*)2  _a3(P_P*)+a4  (p_p)2  (1)
2  2
with a,  >-  O
Following Heller,1975,  the selection of this functional form ensures diminishing marginal
utility for any increase in FDI and increasing marginal (dis)utility for P,  as these variables
rise above a level determined by their target levels (defined with the symbol *).  It
reflects  a compromise  between the need for an estimable functional  form with desirable
utility function properties.S
The target FDI*, or the desired level of FDI, is set in the context of the literature on FDI
that assumes that long-term FDI flows are defined by a series of structural variables  such
as the level of economic development and the quality of the investment  climate in each
country.
FDI = yC  +  Y 2Y  (2)
where  IC is an indicator of the quality of the investment climate and Y the level of
economic development or the market size. These two variables  have been retained
following the recent literature on the determinants of FDI.  The importance of these two
factors is linked with the two main motivations  for FDI: investments are especially
sensitive to the investment climate, since multinational can generally choose between
locations; investments  aimed at the local market are most easily attracted by large
6 markets.  In our attempt to select  these extemal  variables,  we also considered  others
factors, in particular infrastructure  and education variables,  as well as regional dummies,
but those added only limited and inconsistent explanatory power.
5 See Heller,  1975, or Mosley et al.,  1987,  for a similar utility function.
6These two motivations  are sometimes referred  as vertical  and horizontal FDI. For a good
summary on these views,  see S. L. Brainard,  1997.
6We assume that the level of promotion has no effect on the desired level of FDI in long-
run following the arguments developed by Wells and Wint, 2001, that justify the use of
investment promotion principally on a temporary basis.  Promotion agencies are viewed
as vehicles for addressing coordination and information issues that tend to disappear over
time.  Since promotion  does not influence FDI flows in the long run, we can write that
the desired level of public resources devoted to promotion is, equal to 0.
P* = 0  (3)
Next, we capture the eventual temporary  influence of investment promotion  on FDI flows
by:
FDI = AP  (4)
with  A Ž0
Maximizing equation (1) with respect to FDI and P and subject to constraint (4) yield tc
the following equation:
FDI = /o  + A3P +8 21C +/33Y
with  fi0 =  - ;  =-;  =  2 = r,  3 = Y2
a2 a2
From equation  (5) we define  PI  as a measure of IPA effectiveness.  Since our model will
be estimated in logarithmic form, the value of PI describes the elasticity of the investment
promotion effort and FDI inflows.  The main feature of equation (5)  is that the IPA
effectiveness is measured by taking into account the influence of external  variables and
IPA characteristics.  Such influence has to be considered because  an increase in FDI
flows can occur independently of a greater promotion effort, for example through an
improvement in the macro-economic  stability,  and a consequent positive relationship
observed between  the promotion effort and FDI may only be-spurious.
7The basic model remains can be extended in three directions.  First, the coefficient  fi, is
likely to vary depending on the country's policy environment even though it is not clear a
priori in which direction.  For example, one might suspect that investment promotion  is
more effective  in a good than in a poor policy environment because it is easier to
convince potential  investors to come to an attractive country.  However,  in such a
context, it could also be argued that the agency is redundant.  Most investors  are well
aware of opportunities  in their field or industries, and do not really need to contact (or to
be contacted by) an investment promotion agency.
To account for the influence of the environment on IPA effectiveness,  equation (5) can be
modified by associating  multiplicative dummy variables to the promotion effort.  These
dummies will be defined to test whether threshold values in the external variables,  say the
quality of the investment climate influences the effectiveness  of the promotion agencies.
This approach lies on the belief that above or below specific  values the role and
performance of the promotion agency differ.  Alternatively,  we can explore the
possibility of a linear relationship between the effectiveness  of promotion and the
country's environment.  Following Burnside and Dollar, 2000, this can be done by adding
an interaction  termn between the promotion effort and the investment climate into equation
(5):
FDI  = 3o +/AP+/ 2EV+/3 (PxIC)  (6)
where IC is defined as the log of the investment climate indicator used.  Taking the
derivative of the FDI inflows with respect to the promotion effort, we can identify the
relationship between  the IPA effectiveness and the quality of the investment
aFDI
climate,  =  i  + J,63IC.  The IPA effectiveness is defined as a linear function of the
quality of the investment as long as the coefficient  ,83 is significantly different from 0.
The second extension is to assess whether IPA effectiveness is influenced  by which
functions does the agency carry on.  To capture these functions, we simply rewrite our
8basic equation (5) by separating  the promotion effort (P) in the several categories defined
by Wells and Wint, 2001; that are image-building,  investor servicing,  investment
generation,  and policy advocacy.  These activities have been extensively detailed by these
two authors and will not be explained in this paper (see Annex A for a brief summary).
Here it suffices  to indicate that they are generally well known by managers of investment
promotion agencies and experts in that field.
A third and final extension is to incorporate  a number of internal characteristics  of the
promotion agencies as explanatory variables into equation (5).  In doing so, we follow
again Wells and Wint, 2001.  In particular, these authors have argued that such
effectiveness rnight be strengthened  when the agency benefits from the involvement of
the private sector and a focus mandate on investment promotion.
III.  Definition of Variables and Sources of Data
This section discusses, first, the selection of variables used for the application of the
model developed  above.  Then, we briefly describe  some of the methodological  choices
that we had to face.
We used as a first indicator total gross FDI inflows as defined by UNCTAD, which offers
a more complete country's coverage than the IMF or the World Bank's database.  This
indicator presents the double advantage to be relatively homogenous across countries and
relatively well used in the economic literature, therefore facilitating comparisons.  It may
be however biased  for our purpose of measuring the IPA effectiveness  since many
agencies have reported that they do not have the main responsibility for privatization and
for the mining sector --two important channels of FDI worldwide.  For this reason, using
the UNCTAD data, we adjusted gross FDI flows by the amount of Merger  &
Acquisitions (M&A) in each country.  The idea is to capture more accurately  the FDI
flows that are under the direct control of most IPAs.
9The promotion  effort (P) is measured by the annual  budget of each agency converted into
US dollars.  This conversion  assumes that  each dollar spent by the agencies has the same
value  across countries, which  might introduce inconsistencies  for cross-country
comparisons.  While the costs of certain promotional activities  are independent of the
IPA location (e.g.,  the cost of an advertisement in an international newspaper would in
principle be the same for Ethiopia and Germany),  some expenses vary greatly  across
countries.  For these reasons, we also measure the promotion effort by the number of
professional  staff dedicated to investment promotion  in each agency.  This proxy does not
vary with the exchange  rate and accounts  for different purchasing  value across countries.
However, it makes the strong assumption  that labor (rather than  money) determines the
level of promotion effort in each country.  Both variables -the IPA budgets and staff-
have been extracted from the survey conducted by the Foreign Investment  Advisory
Service of the World Bank in early 2002.
As explained  earlier, the promotion effort has been  separated into four categories  so that
we can capture better what IPA do.  We follow Wells and Wint, 2001, and distinguish  the
following  activities: investment generation (IG), policy advocacy (PA), investor servicing
(IS), and image-building  (IB).  The budgetary resources  allocated to each of these
functions have also been identified using the FIAS  survey.
The internal characteristics  of the agency have been captured through the FIAS survey,
including a) age of the agency, b) legal status (founded by law or decree),  c) institutional
affiliation and linkages  with government (public, semi-public,  autonomous, or private
body),  d) linkages with the private sector (financial  contribution, frequency  of meetings
and inputs, degree of private sector representation  on board),  e) reporting arrangements
(board, government body, prime minister or president), f) overseas offices, g) number of
mandates  on top of foreign investment promotion (e.g., export promotion,  privatization
programs,)  and f) staff's characteristics and salary policy.
We tested several  indicators of the quality of the investment climate such  as the ones
developed  by the World Economic Forum, Harvard,  the Heritage Foundation,
10Intemational  Country Risk, etc.  After numerous tests, we selected the Heritage Index as
it had added the highest explanatory  power to our model.7 Similarly, we used three as
alternative indicators for the local market  size: GDP, population,  and income per capita.
All these variables  appear highly correlated for our sample of countries, and the level of
income generated the most robust results  per capita, hence we retained this variable.
We explore the relationship between the investment promotion effort and FDI inflows in
58 countries  during 2001.8  Our sample is diversified  in terms of regions, level of income
per capita, as well as the magnitude  of investment promotion  efforts.  To keep some
homogeneity,  we include only countries that have reported national investment
promotion  agencies.  We exclude countries,  such as the US, China, Brazil, and India, that
have only regional agencies since it was difficult to assess their contribution to FDI flows
at the national level.  This omission may be important because these countries account for
a substantial share of FDI worldwide.
While the data obtained from the FIAS  survey are unique,  they are only available for the
year 2001.  For this reason,  our approach can only be cross-sectional.  By doing this, we
do not necessarily assume that promotion has an immediate effect on overall FDI flows
because we use a cross-country rather than time-series analysis.  Our results would be
significantly biased only if we had depicted  large variations in the promotion effort over
the last few years.  Fortunately, it appears that variations in the promotion effort across
7 Indeed, as recently confirmed by Batra and Moody, 2002, variations in cross-country FDI flows are well
explained  by these factors over the past decade.  The Heritage Foundation Index captures 50 independent
variables  divided into  10 broad factors of economic  freedom related to internal and external
macroeconomic  conditions, economic openness,  and political and institutional  health.  The higher the score
on a given factor, the greater the level  of government interference in the economy  and the less economic
freedom  a country enjoys. The index assigns scores inversely  to the state of the investment  climate; hence
we expect a negative sign on the coefficient  of the estimation.
8 'he list of countries  is the following: Armenia, Bangladesh,  Belgium, Benin, Bolivia,  Bosnia And
Herzegovina,  Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote D'Ivoire, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Finland, Georgia,  Greece,
Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong,, Indonesia, Ireland,  Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya,  Korea, Latvia,
Lesotho,  Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique,  Nepal, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay,
Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa,  Sri Lanka, Saint Lucia, Thailand, Trinidad and
Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Vanuatu,  Venezuela.countries reported for the year 2001 are not significantly different than those that existed
in the late  1990s.9
We use the Ordinary Least Squares  (OLS) technique to estimate our basic FDI equation.
In doing so, we assume that the level of promotion effort is weakly exogenous in the
sense that the promotion effort is not contemporaneously  affected by FDI flows.
Although we cannot, in the absence of time-series analysis, prove that causality runs from
promotion to investment,  it seems unlikely that increases in foreign investment will
typically cause an increase in the promotion effort.  Recent experience  suggests that IPA
budgets are determlined  and approved within a business plan that usually covers a 3-5
year period.  They are rarely revised as a result of FDI flows, at least not in the short
term.  Moreover, since the main source of IPA funding is the government,  some degree of
inertia is expected to be associated with public finance decisions.10
lWv.  Empiricall  ResuRts
Our main empirical results are summarized in the Table  1. Overall,  the results appear
satisfactory,  as the explanatory  power of the regressions  is relatively high, in spite of the
limited number of explanatory  variables.
By assuming that causality runs from promotion effort to FDI flows, we find that
investment promotion is positively associated with cross-country  variations in FDI flows
-the elasticity coefficient is equal to 0.25.  More importantly,  this finding holds when we
account for the influence  of the investment climate, as measured by the Heritage Index,
and the level of development in each country.  It also continues to be robust using
9  For fuller details on this point, see Morisset and Johnson, 2003.
10  Of course, abrupt changes in IPA budget are always possible due to budgetary crises in government or
the termination of external assistance.  However,  these events occurred  in a very few countries of our
sample, hence  we believe that they  will not significantly affect our empirical results that capture  trends
across  a sample of 58 countries.
12alternative definitions of FDI inflows.  Still, our simple and restricted correlation between
the IPA budget and FDI must be interpreted  with caution.  The positive and significant
correlation does not necessarily imply that promotion always positively affects FDI, but it
makes it more difficult to argue that promotion  is in fact bad for attracting FDI.  The
positive correlation, in other words, restricts the range of possibilities.
Table 1:
Estimated Elasticity Coefficients a/,b/, c/
(t-statistics  in Parenthesis)
FDI  FDI (ADJUSTED
FOR M&A)
IPA Budget  .25  .31
(2.41)  (3.33)
IPA Staff  .26  .20
(1.56)  (1.14)
investment climate-Heritage  -1.62  -1.64  -1.78  -1.90
(4.09)  (-3.80)  (4.15)  (4.12)
GDP per capita  .57  .73  .42  .49
(2.48)  (3.10)  (1.67)  (2.11)
Observations  58  49  51  43
AdjR2 .682  .683  .696  .681
Notes:
a/ All  variables are in logs except for the Heritage Index. for which an improvement captured by
a decline in the indicator.
b/ We omitted to report the constant term.
c/ Numerous other external variables  were tested in the regressions including GDP, regional
dummies, other investment climate indicators.  In general, the results were robust independently
of the inclusion or exclusion of these variables.
This positive association  is found when the promotion effort is measured by the IPA
budget.  When effort is measured by the level of human resources, the relationship is also
positive, but not statistically significant.  It is possible that the close relationship of FDI
to expenditures  means that promotion activities require less labor than money.  Anecdotal
evidence  collected at the country level reveals that fixed labor costs usually account for
less than one-third of an agency  total budget --the bulk of expenses is associated with
buildings, promotion materials, advertisement,  and promotional trips.
13One concern  is that the IPA effectiveness  is affected by the size of their budgets, which
vary considerably across countries.  1'  Using a kernel or neighborhood function'2 we find
that up to a minimum budget of about US$64,000 IPAs seem to have no (or even
negative) impact on FDI.  Between a budget of US$64,000 and US$2 million -IPAs are
effective, and the elasticity is about 0.5.  Between US$2 and US$11  million, the
estimated elasticity reaches its maximum value.  On average, we find that a 10 %
increase in the IPA budget is associated with a 7.5%  increase  in FDI flows, which is three
times higher than the elasticity estimated for the entire sample.  Finally, above a budget
of about US$11  rmillion, promotion expenditures are ineffective.
Although these results should be interpreted with caution, they suggest that small
agencies  are not really effective at attracting FDI.  Presumably,  the existence of a
threshold reflects the significant fixed costs associated with numerous activities, such as
advertising  and image building.13 Still, agencies that are too big have their own
problems.  There is a maximum level of resources beyond which there are decreasing
economies of scale -even though this limit appears  out of reach of many agencies.  The
existence  of decreasing marginal returns can also be explained in the light of the
analytical arguments used to justify the creation of IPAs.  Beyond a limit, it is unlikely
that the agency can contribute more to resolving the information and coordination issues
that had justified its creation.
It is worth underscoring that we have not been able to depict any significant patterns associated with the
size of IPAs budgets.  For example,  we did not find that IPA budgets were significantly correlated  to
country's  size or levels of development -at for our sample of countries.  Granted, IPAs located in industrial
countries have generally higher budgets than those located  in developing countries, but this positive
correlation  does not hold for other categories such as low income and middle income countries.
12 This method  is adaptive  and dynamic in the sense that the slope parameter changes along the regression
curve depending on the location of the varnables in the sample.  More specifically,  we minimize the
weighted  sum-of-squared errors  between the actual and the fitted by allowing the program to compute a
regression at every point in our data set.  A kernel fit is superior to the regression analysis because the latter
assumes constancy of the slope parameters.
13 This is easy to understand: an advertising campaign in an international newspaper can reach
several thousands of US$ dollars; promotional trips and participation  to fairs can be equally
expensive;  as are the needs of potential investors when they visit the country.
14Our empirical  analysis clearly confirms that the quality of the investment climate and the
level of development have a significant effect on IPA performance.  14  The better the
investment climate, the greater IPA effectiveness.  Similarly, the higher the level of
development;  the more effective an IPA is.  These linear relationships between  the IPA
effectiveness  and these external variables  are captured in the two following equations (all
variables  are expressed in logs):
dFDI/dPE =  0.552 - 0.289 IC
(4.59)  (-4.31)
dFDI/dPE =  -0.110 +0.042 Y
(-0.56)  (2.79)
More concretely, by applying these relationships  to our sample of countries, they indicate
that the IPA effectiveness  ranges from 0.16 for the agency located in the country with the
worst investment climate to above 0.35 for the country with the best investment climate.
Similar large differences  in the impact of the promotion effort  are also depicted in
function of the country's income per capita..
We now turn  to the question  whether promotion effectiveness  is influenced not only by
the amount of resources spent by the agency but also by how these resources  are
allocated across its functions or activities.  We estimated equation (5), except that we
broke IPA spending into the four components identified earlier to detect their influence
on FDI inflows.  Each function was estimated separately to avoid multi-co linearity
problems between these variables.  The estimated elasticity coefficients  are presented in
Table 2.
The estimated results reveal that policy advocacy  appears to have the strongest impact on
F'DI inflows, followed by image-building,  investor servicing,  and investment generation.
However,  there does not appear to be a significant  difference between image-building
and investment servicing, both of which appear equally effective and not far behind
4 We  were unable to identify threshold values using multiplicative  dummues.
15policy advocacy.  1516  Our finding that policy advocacy seems to be the most effective
IPA function is consistent with our previous result that IPA effectiveness  is positively
correlated with the quality of the investment climate.  Most IPAs are in a strategic
position to carry out policy advocacy  activities because of their interface between the
private and the public sector.  By contrast, the weak elasticity coefficient associated with
the investment generation  function can be explained by the high cost and high degree of
expertise required to effectively  carry out targeted programs.  An agency needs
specialists, by sectors or enterprises,  and usually time and attention to convince a
particular  n investor to locate in its country.  Most practitioners  would agree that for each
US$1  spent, investment generation  has the lowest return,  and especially in our sample
that includes a majority of countries with relatively poor investment climates.
Table 2:
Elasticity Coeffcient by IPA Functions
FUNCTION/  ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS
.30
Policy Advocacy  (2.14)
Image Building  .25
(2.32)
Investor Servicing/Facilitation  .24
(2.17)
Investment Generation  .18*
(1.79)
*All coefficients  are statistically significant at 5%, except the one
associated  with investment generation,  which is at the 10% level.
15 The three coefficients associated  to these variables are not significantly different from each other at the
5%  level,  but only at the 10%.
16 These estimated results represent an average for all IPAs,  they do not account for the charactenstics of
each country in which the IPA is located.  As  we did earlier for the overall IPA budget,  we explore whether
the effects associated with each function vary depending on the country's environment but, in that case, we
were unable to find any statistical variations in our sampleWe used the same approach than for the overall
EPA budget, but apply it to each EPA function.  Unfortunately,  these series of tests were non-conclusive in
depicting any significant cross-country  differences  in the estimated impact of each EPA function.
16The conceptual framework  developed by Wells and Wint,  1990 and revised in 2001,
suggests that an IPA's effectiveness  is influenced by its institutional structure and
reporting mechanisms.  Although we tested several internal characteristics  using both
dummy variables and interactive tenns associated with the IPA budget variable,  only
three of them seem to have significant effects on the effectiveness of IPAs across
countries  (Table 3)17.  First, FDI flows are significantly lower in countries  where the IPA
is part of a ministry in contrast to be an autonomous  body or a joint private-public
institution.  Second, the effectiveness of IPAs is enhanced when the agency reports to a
supervisory board that includes representatives  of the private sector ---the higher the
number of private members, the greater IPA effectiveness18. Finally, IPA effectiveness  is
enhanced when it reports directly to a country's president or a prime minister.
Table 5:
The influence of IPA characteristics  on FDI Inflows
(T-statistics  in parenthesis)
Dependant Variable/Explanatory  Variable  FDI  FDI  FDI
Public agency*dummy  -.79
(-2.43)
Number of private representatives  in the Board *Budget c/  .052
(2.72)
Prime Minister/President  Dummy  .53
(1.80)
IPA Budget  .21  .22  .25
(1.95)  (2.01)  (2.29)
Observations  56  36  55
AdjR2 0.71  0.72  0.68
Notes:
a/We omit to report the results associated  with the constant term, GNI per capita, the Heritage Index that
wei e also included in the above regressions.
b/All variables are in logs, except for Heritage  Index and the dummy variables.
c/ The number of representatives starts from 1  to the maximum registered  in our survey.
17 The methodology  was twofold.  First, we used dummy variables  and, second, an interactive term
multiplied to the IPA budget.  The first approach captures  the possible effect of the EPA characteristics  on
the FDI flows, independently  of the promotion effort.  The second approach assumes a linear relationship
between the EPA budget and the EPA characteristics.  These two approaches have been detailed in  the
precedent technical appendix.
18 An agency  with I private representative  would report an elasticity  coefficient equals to 0.22, while an
agency with 8 private sector representatives  in its Board  will see its effectiveness increase to about 0.32.
17These findings confirm  that the most effective IPAs benefit from visibility and from
participation by the private  sector through their boards or through institutional relations.
These characteristics  reinforce the leverage of the agency and its role.  They also indicate
that including  the private sector contributes to broaden the platform and help to achieve a
consensus in the agency's effort to market the country abroad.  Yet, they should not be
used to overestimate the role of the investment agency.  The reporting mechanism  to the
president or the prime minister may reflect the overall commitment of the government
toward reforms.  Within  that context, the positive correlations  reported above, while
indicative, would capture this global trend in the government's  effort rather than the
agency's own performance.
Finally, it is worth reporting that some IPA characteristics  do not seem to influence the
agency performance.  The agency's mandate,  staff qualification,  and the number of
overseas  agencies have no significant effect on FDI flows.  It is possible that these
characteristics  do not matter.  Another possibility is that our survey has too little
variations in these factors to identify their eventual impact on the effectiveness  of IPAs.
'V.  Concllsion and Policy Recomximendations
The story that emerges from our investigation  is that the IPAs are effective in influencing
decision to invest.  Although our empirical exercise suffers from obvious  limitations,
their role seems significant,  on top of the influence  of key factors such as the quality of
the investment climate and the country's  market size.
The finding that promotion is positively associated with FDI inflows across countries has
to be qualified because it is closely link to the environment in which the agency operates.
Investment promotion  is more effective in a country  with a good investment climate and
a relative high level of development.  In fact, our results suggest that promotion can be
even counterproductive  in a country that offers  a poor investment climate.  It seems more
difficult to convince  an investor to come back if he was disillusioned during  his first visit
18to a country.  The disappointed investor is also likely to be vocal about his
disenchantment  and, so, discourage  other potential investors.
The functions  carried on by the promotion  agency can influence  its effectiveness.  Our
empirical results reveal that policy advocacy is the most effective function for attracting a
dollar of investment, followed by image-building,  and investor servicing.  Investment
generation  appears  to be the least efficient or cost-effective, partly because it is expensive
and partly because it is often not adapted to the reality of our sample of countries that
have relative poor investment climates.  While the optimal level of budget that should be
allocation in each function depends on the country,  our results suggest that-most agencies
would gain by devoting  more attention to policy advocacy.
Political visibility and participation  of the private sector appear to be two elements that
contribute to the success of IPAs.  Political  visibility is best attained when the agency is
linked directly  to the highest government officials  (e.g. the president or the prime
minister).  Private sector involvement can be secured through participation in the board
thalt  supervises the agency.
Our paper should be viewed  as a first attempt to examine empirically the effectiveness  of
investment promotion agencies  across countries because it contains obvious  limitations.
Below are proposed three directions for future research.  The first direction would consist
of completing the data collected in our survey, not only by including more countries but
also by extending the coverage period over time.  Future researchers,  depending on the
data availability, should carefully explore  the time lag between overall investment
promotion and the decision of foreign investors to invest in the country.  This time lag
can vary depending  on the country's conditions and the functions carried out by the
agency.
The second direction should be to consider a more complex and realistic objective
function for the IPAs.  Our approach subscribes  to the view that IPA's main objective is
to attract more (foreign) investors.  Such an assumption is certainly correct but simplistic
19because some agencies assign more emphasis on the quality than the quantity of FDI.
This is certainly true for sophisticated IPAs that focus on job creation,  exports  or
technology transfers associated to FDI flows.  Along the same lines, one may want to
explore whether the IPA effectiveness  varies depending on the kind of FDI  (e.g., sectors,
reinvested  earnings vs. mergers, etc.).
The third and final direction would be to proceed with individual case studies.  Our study
was aimed at capturing trend across  a relatively large set of countries  at the expense of
details.  A complementary  approach would be to focus on a few LPAs, with a special
attention on their internal characteristics  and external  environment.  Evaluations of their
particular promotional  techniques (such  as image building, investment service,
investment generation,  and policy advocacy)  and of different structures  (such as
government and quasi-government)  should add considerably  to the evidence  on the
influence of promotion  on investment flows and to an understanding  of the kinds of
investors likely to be influenced by promotion efforts.
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21ANNEX
The Functions of an Investment  Promotion Agency
While there  are alternative  ways  to separate  the different  functions  carried on by
an investment promotion  agency,  we  have retained the grouping  proposed by
Wells  and Wint in  their seminal  paper published  in  1990  and revised in 2001.
Based on their observation  of a large of agencies,  both in the  developing and
industrial world, these  authors have  proposed the following  categories  that are
briefly described  below.
Image -Building is the function  of creating the  perception  of a  country as an
attractive  site for international  investment.  Activities commonly  associated  with
image-building  include  focused advertising,  public relations events, the
generation  of favorable news stories by cultivating  journalists,  and so on.
InvestorFacilitation  and Investors Servicing refers to the range  of services
provided  in a host  country that can assist an investor in analyzing  investment
decisions,  establishing  a business,  and maintaining  it in good standing.  Activities
in this area  include  information provision,  "one-stop  shop" service aimed  at
expediting  approval process,  and various assistance  in obtaining  sites, utilities,
etc.
Investment Generation  entails targeting  specific sectors  and companies with  a
view  to creating investment  leads.  Activities  include identification  of potential
sectors  and investors,  direct mailing,  telephone  campaigns,  investor forums and
seminars  and individual presentations  to targeted  investors.  Investment
generation  activities can be done both at home  and overseas.
Policy Advocacy consists  of the activities  through which the agency supports
initiatives  to improve  the  quality of the investment  climate  and identifies the
views  of the private  sector on that matter.  Activities  include  surveys of the
private  sector,  participation  in task forces,  policy and legal proposals,  and
lobbying.
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